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Recent Decisions
contractual interest is not absolutely required, the "focus should be
on a particular project."67 In the event the individual challenging
the ordinance has neither a property interest which is adversely
affected nor a sufficient personal interest in a recently proposed
housing project, he has no other presently available avenue of at-
tack.
Viewed against the background of the standing doctrine as it has
developed since Data Processing, Warth may be seen as foreshadow-
ing a reversal of the recent plaintiff-oriented philosophy; it may also
be interpreted as a refusal to open the courts' doors any further.
With increasing attention being given to zoning patterns in subur-
ban communities and their effect upon minority residents in urban
areas who desire better living conditions, Warth shows the Court's
reluctance to break down long held notions of the right of residents
to control the development of their communities with a minimum
of outside intervention. In light of the departure of Justice Douglas,
who has long been a vigorous proponent of a liberalized standing
doctrine, the chances of a reversal in the current philosophy of the
Court appear dim.
Walter John Rackley
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PRO-
CESS-STATE ACTION-TERMINATION OF SERVICE BY A STATE-
REGULATED PUBLIC UTILITY-The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's connec-
tion with the termination of service by a public utility corporation
was insufficient to make the utility's conduct attributable to the
state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
1208 (8th Cir. 1972) (standing was granted to plaintiffs who wished to move into a specific
project in which corporate plaintiffs had made a substantial investment); Crow v. Brown, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (individual plaintiffs were
on a waiting list to move into planned low income apartments upon completion); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971) (corporate plaintiffs had committed themselves contractually and federal assistance
had been approved); Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), aff'g 296 F. Supp. 266
(W.D. Okla. 1969) (corporate plaintiff needed only a zoning amendment to commence con-
struction and individual plaintiff was a potential renter in that project). Cf. United Farm-
workers Housing Project, Inc. v. Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (once municipal
services are extended to outsiders, such extensions must be granted in a nondiscriminatory
manner).
67. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Metropolitan Edison Company was a privately owned and oper-
ated Pennsylvania corporation holding a certificate of public con-
venience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission
(PUC). Petitioner Jackson brought suit against Metropolitan for
damages and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,'
alleging that respondent had terminated electric service to her home
without notice, hearing or an opportunity to pay any amounts due.'
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania granted respondent's motion for dismissal:' on the ground that
the termination did not involve state action.' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, ', and certiorari was
granted.'
1. The Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, originally the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was
enacted to implement the fourteenth amendment. It states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. The petitioner, Catherine Jackson, received electrical service from the respondent at
her home until September, 1970. At that time her account was terminated for delinquency
in payments allegedly due; service was resumed in the name of James Dodson, another
occupant of the residence. Whether Dodson paid his bills was an unsettled factual dispute.
He left the residence in August of 1971 without informing the respondent, which continued
service for a time without receiving any payment. Petitioner asserted no bills arrived during
that time. Respondent's employees visited the residence on October 6, 1971, inquiring for
Dodson. Another employee came the next day and informed petitioner that the meter had
been tampered with and would not register current used. Petitioner claimed ignorance of this,
and asked that the account be shifted to the name of Robert Jackson, later identified as
petitioner's 12 year old son. Four days later respondent terminated service without further
notice. Brief for Petitioner at 4-7, Brief for Respondent at 2-3, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
3. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
4. State action is the level of involvement of government in the actions of private individ-
uals which brings their conduct within the strictures of the fourteenth amendment, which
provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ..
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Thus the wrongful act of an individual or
private corporation, unsupported by state authority or assistance, is beyond the purview of
the fourteenth amendment or the Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
5. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973).
6. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 415 U.S. 912 (1974).
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THE OPINION
Petitioner alleged state action on the grounds that the respondent
was a state-sanctioned monopoly,7 that electricity was an essential
of life, the delivery of which by a private entity was a "public func-
tion,"' and that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was signifi-
cantly involved with the activities of the respondent.' Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for six members of the Court,"' denied each
contention. The Court doubted that the State had actually granted
or guaranteed the respondent a monopoly;" even if it existed, a
monopoly would not be determinative of whether termination of
service was state action. The petitioner argued that state action
existed on the basis of Public Utility Commission v. Pollak,'" in
which the Court found a sufficiently close relation between the ac-
tions of a congressionally mandated but privately owned monopoly
and the federal government. But the Pollak Court, wrote Justice
Rehnquist, had not based its finding of governmental action on the
transit company's monopoly.'" He also observed that no state action
7. Brief for Petitioner at 13-15.
8. Id. at 15-21.
9. Id. at 21-27.
10. Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ. joined in the opinion.
11. Justice Rehnquist found neither respondent's certificate of public convenience, issued
as a prerequisite to operating a utility under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1121 (1959), nor any
other statute indicated that respondent had been granted or guaranteed a monopoly. In fact,
respondent faced competition within some portions of its territory. 419 U.S. 351 n.8.
12. 343 U.S. 451 (1952). The Capital Transit Company operated the public transit facili-
ties of the District of Columbia. It installed loudspeakers in its buses and streetcars, through
which it piped in music, commercials and news. After receiving a number of protests, the
District Public Utilities Commission investigated the broadcasting practice, which it found
was not "inconsistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety." The PUC dismissed its
investigation and denied reconsideration; the irked commuters took their protest to the fed-
eral courts, contending that the broadcasting violated the right of privacy guaranteed by the
first amendment without the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth. Id. at 453-61. The
Supreme Court found that a "sufficiently close relation" between the federal government and
the radio broadcasting required consideration of the constitutional claims. Id. at 462. Because
Pollak arose in the District of Columbia, the issue was "governmental" rather than "state"
action. The principal was, however, the same.
13. 419 U.S. at 352. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Pollak Court had "expressly dis-
claimed reliance" on the transit authority's monopoly status. Justice Burton had stated in
PoUak that in finding a "sufficiently close relation" between the government and the utility,
the Court had not relied on the "mere fact" that the utility operated under congressional
authority and as a result enjoyed a substantial monopoly. The Court relied "particularly"
on the fact that the PUC, a government agency, had investigated and approved the practice
in question. 343 U.S. at 462.
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was found in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 4 where "certain monop-
oly aspects were presented." In neither Pollak nor Moose Lodge was
there a sufficient relationship between the challenged activities and
the entities' monopoly status.'
The petitioner contended that respondent provided an essential
public service necessary to life and required by statute to be fur-
nished on a reasonably continuous basis." Although the Court rec-
ognized that state action had been found in the exercise by private
entities of powers traditionally reserved exclusively to the states,"
the majority found no such "public function" in Jackson. The deliv-
ery of utility service was not considered a power traditionally asso-
ciated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain; moreover, the
statutory duty to furnish the service was imposed on the utility, not
on the state. The petitioner asserted that since a public utility
acted in the public interest in delivering essential services, it could
not terminate service without procedural due process. The Court
interpreted this reasoning as an invitation to declare that all busi-
nesses "affected with the public interest" are state actors in all their
actions; the Court declined the invitation, citing its decision in
Nebbia v. New York2" that there is no distinct class or category of
business "affected with a public interest." The phrase means only
that an industry is justifiably subject to regulation for the public
good; such a public interest nature without more does not convert
otherwise private action into state action.2'
Justice Rehnquist rejected the contention that the state had "spe-
cifically authorized and approved" 2 the termination procedure."'
Provisions specifying respondent's right to terminate for nonpay-
ment had for many years been inserted in each of respondent's
14. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See text at notes 45-47 infra.
15. 419 U.S. at 352.
16. The statute provides in pertinent part that "every public utility shall furnish .. .
reasonable service. . . .Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unrea-
sonable interruptions or delay." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959).
17. 419 U.S. at 352.
18. Id. at 353. The Pennsylvania courts had rejected the contention that the delivery of
certain utility services was a state or municipal duty. See Baily v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594,
39 A. 494 (1898) (natural gas); Girard Life Ins. Co. v. City of Phila., 88 Pa. 393 (1879) (water).
19. Brief for Petitioner at 18-19.
20. 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
21. 419 U.S. at 353-54.
22. Brief for Petitioner at 27-33.
23. 419 U.S. at 354.
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general tariffs submitted for approval to the PUC; hearings had
been held on the rate portions of those tariffs, but the termination
provision had never been "the subject of a hearing or other scrutiny
by the Commission.""4 Under Pennsylvania law, the provisions be-
came effective automatically after sixty days when not specifically
disapproved by the PUC;2' in the Court's view, that type of review
was not sufficient to constitute state action. In this part of her
argument petitioner relied again on Pollak, which Justice Rehnquist
distinguished because the PUC in that case specifically investigated
and explicitly approved the challenged activity; the Pennsylvania
PUC had never taken notice of nor any action upon the respondent's
termination procedures. Noting that a regulated private utility was
often required by law to obtain approval for practices that any unre-
gulated business could freely institute, the Court held that approval
of such a request by a state utility commission was not state action
if the commission did not put its weight on the side of the proposed
practice by ordering it.2
Extensive state regulation did not in itself create state action, but
the acts of a heavily regulated utility something like a government-
protected monopoly might more readily be found to involve state
action. The test was whether a "sufficiently close nexus" between
the state and the challenged actions of the utility justified treating
the actions as those of the state.27 In the Court's view, the petitioner
had shown only that Metropolitan was a heavily regulated privately
owned utility enjoying at least a partial monopoly, which had termi-
nated service in a manner which the Pennsylvania PUC found per-
missible under state law. Such a showing was insufficient to connect
the state with the challenged practice for the purposes of the four-
teenth amendment. 28
24. d.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1148 (1959).
26. 419 U.S. at 357.
27. Id. at 350-51.
28. Id. at 358-59. Because the issue of state action was resolved against the petitioner, the
Court did not decide whether electric service was property for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall each filed a dissent. Justice Douglas
felt the majority had erred by considering in isolation each factor advanced by the petitioner
and dismissing each as individually insufficient for a finding of state action. He believed that
under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the aggregate weight of the
factors controlled the determination. 419 U.S. at 359-61.
Justices Douglas and Marshall each found state approval of Metropolitan's termination
provisions in the PUC's failure to challenge them. In Justice Douglas's opinion, the inaction
1976
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 14: 761
ANALYSIS
The Court considered each of petitioner's many arguments in
isolation and rejected each as individually insufficient upon which
to find state action. This analysis seemingly varies with the author-
ity of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," in which the aggre-
gate weight of the factors was considered. In Burton, the parking
authority was a state agency which leased space in one of its munici-
pal parking garages to the private Eagle Coffee Shoppe; the rent
paid by the restaurant partially defrayed the costs of the facility.
The appellant was refused service by the restaurant because of his
race. The question was whether Delaware's involvement with the
admittedly private restaurant amounted to state action such that
the Eagle's discrimination violated the fourteenth amendment. :",
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances," wrote the
Burton Court, "can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance. '"' The Court
listed the various links between the state and the restaurant and
then expressly stated that the sum of the factors indicated a degree
of involvement which the fourteenth amendment condemned.2 Del-
constituted more than mere passive approval; it was abandonment of the agency's duty of
supervision under state law. Id. at 361-62. Justice Marshall saw the PUC's approval of
respondent's general tariff as specific approval of all measures, including the termination
provision, contained therein. Id. at 370.
The two Justices placed great emphasis on the respondent's monopoly. In response to the
majority position that a state-granted monopoly would not be conclusive of state action, the
two dissenters maintained a monopoly would at least be highly relevant to the inquiry. Id.
at 360-61, 366-67. Justice Douglas found the respondent's services were "affected with a
public interest," especially since Metropolitan was the only utility furnishing electric power.
Id. at 361. Justice Marshall pointed out that a state-granted monopoly has been held to
involve state action. Id. at 366-67.
Justice Marshall also took issue with the majority over the question whether the delivery
of electrical service was a "public function." The majority found such delivery was not a
power "traditionally associated with sovereignty"; in Justice Marshall's view, utility service
was traditionally identified with the states because states which do not provide the service
themselves always subject the private providers of service to an all-embracing regulatory
scheme. Id. at 372. Finally, Justice Marshall expressed fear that because the Court had never
accepted the premise that state action analysis should apply different standards in response
to different types of constitutional claims, a state-regulated and monopolistic utility might
now refuse service on a discriminatory basis with impunity. Id. at 373-74.
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30. Id. at 716-22.
31. Id. at 722.
32. Id. at 723-24. Justice Harlan described this cumulative process as "undiscriminatingly
throwing together various factual bits and pieces." Id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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aware had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdepend-
ence with Eagle" that it had to be recognized as a "joint partici-
pant" in the challenged activity. 3
The Jackson Court wrote that state utility commissions were
often statutorily required to approve various business practices of
regulated utilities. When these practices were those any unregulated
business would be free to institute, commission approval did not
convert the practices into state action unless the commission put its
weight on the side of the practice by ordering it. This emphasis on
command rather than approval, though limited in application to
regulated utilities, did not comport with earlier precedents. In
Burton, where Delaware did not exercise its power to require that
the Eagle Coffee Shoppe not discriminate, the Court held that no
state could abdicate its responsibilities of equal protection and that
Delaware became a party to the discrimination by its inaction. The
inaction was in fact an election by the state "to place its power,
property, and prestige" behind the challenged act.:" A number of
other cases also held that approval or something less was sufficient
to involve state action."5
A. Mutual Benefit
Mutual benefit to the parties was a major factor in the Burton
finding that Delaware was a "joint participant" in the coffee shop's
racial discrimination.3 6 The petitioner in Jackson emphasized the
mutually beneficial relationship between Pennsylvania and Metro-
politan Edison," but neither the majority nor the dissenters expli-
33. Id. at 725.
34. Id.
35. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) speak only of the state sanctioning the
challenged act in some way. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Court found state
action in a California constitutional amendment neutral on its face but intended to authorize
discrimination in housing at the seller's individual choice. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court
pointed out that the state regulatory bodies had not "fostered or encouraged" the action. In
Pollak, the PUC approved the practice after it had begun, 343 U.S. at 456. Mere statements
by public officials that civil rights sit-ins would not be tolerated were sufficient to find state
action in the refusal of service by private merchants in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963).
36. 365 U.S. at 723-25.
37. Brief for Petitioner at 21-27. See Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process In Ter-
minations of Utility Services for Nonpayment, 86 HAlv. L. REv. 1477, 1492-93 (1973)
thereinafter cited as Terminations].
1976
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citly considered the issue. The utility had a protected, if not guaran-
teed, monopoly over most of its territory; a practically, if not legally,
guaranteed "fair rate of return"; and, for limited purposes, the
power of eminent domain and the right to enter on private prop-
erty. :" The state benefitted by the insurance of reasonably adequate
utility service to its citizens2 In addition, the state collected reve-
nue on the utility's gross receipts;" the majority discounted this,
stating that all corporations pay taxes to the state. In the case of a
public utility, however, the state may exercise direct control over
the amount of revenue received by setting rates and changing regu-
lations." Thus, the state benefitted directly from the essentially
unfettered termination procedures challenged in Jackson. Unre-
stricted termination is a valuable and cheap collection tool:'2 it
lowers utility rates by lowering operating costs, which benefits util-
ity subscribers and ultimately the state. Moreover, tax revenues
were directly affected by the cost and efficiency of debt collection."'
B. Monopoly
The petitioner especially alleged that the respondent held a mo-
nopoly granted and guaranteed by the state. The Court accepted the
premise arguendo, but rejected the conclusion that state action re-
sulted. The majority relied on Pollak, in which the Court "expressly
disclaimed reliance on the monopoly status of the transit author-
ity," and on Moose Lodge, in which "certain monopoly aspects were
presented" but state action was not found."
Moose Lodge concerned the refusal of a chapter of a national
fraternal organization to serve liquor to the black guest of a mem-
ber. State action was alleged to arise from the lodge's Pennsylvania
liquor license and the extensive regulation to which licensees were
38. 419 U.S. at 368 n.1; City of Pgh. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 182 Pa. Super. 551, 128 A.2d
372 (1956); Terminations, supra note 37, at 1492 n.89.
39. See Terminations, supra note 37, at 1493, and cases cited therein.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 8101 (Supp. 1975).
41. See lhrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot,
409 U.S. 815 (1972).
42. Brief for City of Philadelphia as Amicus Curiae at 2, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Terminations, supra note 37, at 1481-82.
43. Pennsylvania profited by the procedures under attack in Jackson just as Delaware
profited by the action challenged in Burton. Because the Eagle Coffee Shoppe asserted that
integrating its service would injure its business, the Court found the discrimination finan-
cially benefitted the state agency. 365 U.S. at 724.
44. 419 U.S. at 352.
Vol. 14: 761
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subject.'" Club licensees were permitted to serve liquor during longer
hours than retail licensees, so that for a significant time each week
drinks could be purchased only at private clubs. Since no more
licenses were available from the state, Moose Lodge and other club
licensees held some degree of control over the sale of liquor by the
drink;" this oligopolistic edge was the "monopoly aspect" noted in
Jackson. The Moose Lodge majority held that the state regulatory
scheme did not "foster or encourage" racial discrimination, and was
not enough to make the state in effect a partner or joint venturer of
the club; therefore, Pennsylvania was not sufficiently implicated in
the lodge's discriminatory policies to make them state action. 47
Justice Rehnquist wrote in Jackson that state action was not
present in Pollak and Moose Lodge because there was an insuffi-
cient relationship between those entities' monopoly status and the
challenged actions. He continued that there was "no indication of
any greater connection" in the present case." This reading of the
two precedents is somewhat questionable. In Pollak the Court did
not expressly disclaim reliance on the monopoly status of the transit
authority; it did disclaim reliance on the mere fact that the author-
ity enjoyed a substantial monopoly by reason of federal authority.'
The deciding factor in Pollak clearly was not monopoly status, but
rather the PUC's specific investigation and approval of the chal-
lenged practice; nevertheless, the PUC involvement seemed only
the foremost among several relevant considerations.1
The challenged broadcasting in Pollak was objectionable to the
unhappy listeners because due to the transit authority's monopoly
they had no alternative transportation. But the practice was in no
way dependent on the monopoly; the transit company was not able
to broadcast because it held a monopoly, nor would it necessarily
have had to stop the music had the monopoly ceased. In Jackson,
however, there was a greater connection because the efficacy of
unrestricted utility terminations as a collection device and the harm
45. 407 U.S. at 164-65.
46. Id. at 176-77; id. at 183 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 176-77.
48. 419 U.S. at 352.
49. 343 U.S. at 462.
50. Id. It is curious that the Jackson majority relied on the "monopoly aspects" of Moose
Lodge, for the same six Justices comprised the majority in Moose Lodge, where they wrote
that the licensing quota system "falls far short of conferring upon club licensees a monopoly
in the dispensing of liquor .... " 407 U.S. at 177.
1976
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which may result from such terminations were directly dependent
on the utility's lack of competition." The majority never expressly
recognized that point; it seemed to suggest a special category for the
monopoly status of a regulated utility. The Court noted that utili-
ties are "natural monopolies" created by the enormous capital re-
quirements and economies of scale involved in their industries.
State regulation did not create these monopolies; it merely recog-
nized them and intervened to safeguard the public interest by serv-
ing as a substitute for competition.52 The implication seemed to be
that while a monopoly was an important factor in considering the
presence of state action, a "natural" monopoly was of less import-
ance. The respondent may have been a natural monopoly whose
status was not protected by the state. However, a potential competi-
tor could not operate without a certificate of public convenience
issued by the PUC,53 and the state had a clearly enunciated policy
against competition in the provision of utility services..54
51. See Terminations, supra note 37, at 1487-91.
52. 419 U.S. at 351 n.8.
53. Id. at 368 & n.1. The Public Utility Code provides that "[a] certificate of public
convenience shall be granted . . . only if and when . . . the granting of such certificate is
necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public
.... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1123 (1959) (emphasis added). Thus a potential competitor
may enter the field only at the pleasure of the state.
54. Dublin Water Co. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 206 Pa. Super. 180, 213 A.2d 139 (1965);
Painter v. Pennsylvania PUC, 194 Pa. Super. 548, 169 A.2d 113 (1961) (competition within
same area by noncarrier public utilities such as water companies is deleterious and not in
public interest, except in rare instances). For the view that utilities may not be natural
monopolies see Terminations, supra note 37, at 1489 n.70 and materials cited therein. Similar
state authorization of a monopoly has been found to create state action. The Federal Railway
Labor Act authorized railroads and railway labor unions to enter into exclusive union shop
agreements previously prohibited by Nebraska's right-to-work statutes. It was held that
employees in that state whose constitutional rights might be violated by the federally auth-
orized union shop contracts would have a remedy under the fourteenth amendment. Railway
Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). It has been argued that the union shop was
an otherwise "natural monopoly" which had been restrained artifically by Nebraska law; the
federal law in effect authorized or granted a monopoly. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 366-67 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Terminations, supra note 37, at 1489-
90.
Capital investment, economies of scale, and other natural forces aside, state regulation
removes the legal barriers to monopoly. In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) and Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d
1135 (5th Cir. 1971), private antitrust suits against regulated public utilities were dismissed
on the basis that the utilities' actions were the states' actions by virtue of the state regulatory
schemes, and therefore exempt from federal antitrust statutes. Accord, Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943). It is not clear whether fourteenth amendment state action is the same as
state action in the antitrust sense. Since different policies are concerned the two standards
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C. Public Function and Public Interest
The Court recognized that state action is present when a private
entity exercises powers and functions traditionally reserved to the
state; it found the delivery of electricity was not such a public
function.5 Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued that utility service
was in fact an accepted public function .5 Although the state did not
provide electric power, 7 it did more than merely regulate the private
corporations that did provide service. The state reserved the power
to dictate rates, accounting procedures, and standards for facilities
and service; the state conferred on utilities a limited power of emi-
nent domain, the right to enter on private property, and the author-
ity to issue regulations with the force of law."6 Justice Marshall felt
this indicated a conscious choice by the state to utilize private enti-
ties for the delivery of utility services, and to convert those private
corporations into quasi-governmental agencies) 9
The public function argument includes the public interest aspect.
The Court reasoned that all business activities which touch the
public's well being are affected with a public interest, and that
therefore such status alone does not involve state action. As a gen-
eral proposition, that was unarguably correct; but the Court ignored
Burton's admonition to sift facts and weigh circumstances, and did
not inquire into the extent to which the respondent was affected
with a public interest. Justice Douglas observed that the respondent
was the only available source of electric power, an indispensable
element of life in today's society. 0
STATE ACTION AND BALANCING
The concept of state action has drawn critical fire for its impreci-
sion and difficulty of application.' Jackson should add to the com-
need not be identical, but the concept seems the same: whether the state is so involved that
the activity may reasonably be treated as the state's.
55. 419 U.S. at 352-53.
56. Id. at 371.
57. The state does authorize its municipalities to provide electric services at their election.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 38575 (1959) (cities of the third class).
58. 419 U.S. at 368 n.1; Brief for Petitioner at 21-27.
59. 419 U.S. at 368 n.1.
60. Id. at 361. For documentation of the deaths of elderly residents due to utility termina-
tions see Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1974, at 17, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1973, at 26, col. 3;
Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 3; NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1974, at 28.
61. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Forward: State Action, Equal Protection, and
1976
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mentators' consternation. The majority purported to apply the
standard for state action enunciated in Moose Lodge: whether there
is such a "sufficiently close nexus" between the state and the chal-
lenged activities of the regulated body that it is reasonable to treat
the activities as those of the state. "2 The Court drew a line, with
Burton on one side and Moose Lodge on the other, and asked on
which side Jackson fell; they placed it on the Moose Lodge side,
where no state action was found. 3 On its facts, however, Jackson
seems to belong with Burton. Utilities are subject to unique and
pervasive regulation and are public as in Burton, not private as in
Moose Lodge."4 This inconsistency indicates the Court may be im-
plicitly considering other factors. Commentators have suggested the
finding of state action is in reality a policy decision arrived at by
balancing competing rights." The clash has generally been between
property rights and those rights, especially equal protection, which
are guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. If the
rights asserted by the challenger are found dominant, the Court
announces that state action is present and applies the fourteenth
amendment. If the defendant's claimed rights prevail, the Court
denies the existence of state action.66
California's PropositiOn 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 89, 91 (1967).
62. 419 U.S. at 351.
63. Id. It is not at all clear from their respective facts that state action existed on the
Burton rather than the Moose Lodge side. The mutual benefits arising from each relationship
are at least equal and probably greater in Moose Lodge. The Eagle Restaurant in Burton
leased its space on somewhat favorable terms and the Parking Authority used the rents to
offset the costs of building and operating its parking garage; it has been strongly suggested
that the Moose Lodge owed its success and possibly its very existence to its possession of the
liquor license. Brief for Appellee at 61-62, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972);
8 N. ENG. L. REV. 251, 269-71 (1973). Furthermore, the state received significant income as
the monopoly liquor dealer, and whatever intangible social benefits the legislature foresaw
in enacting the regulatory scheme. The degree of state control was definitely greater and more
direct in Moose Lodge. In Burton, the state had a right of control through its general police
powers and in its role as a lessor. But in describing the powers of control in Moose Lodge,
the district court stressed "the uniqueness and all-pervasiveness of the regulation of the
dispensing of liquor under licenses granted by the state." Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246,
1248 (M.D. Pa. 1970). See also 8 N. ENG. L. REV. 251, 252 (1973).
64. The mutual benefits present in Jackson were much like those held important in
Burton. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Comment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).
66. An interesting case in light of this thesis is CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973), in which both parties asserted first amendment rights. The network had declined
to sell airtime to the Democrats; in the court struggle that ensued, CBS claimed freedom of
the press while the Democrats declared that their right to be heard had been violated. The
Court upheld CBS's position, but splintered on the question of whether a Federal Communi-
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The results, if not the purported rationales, of the cases in ques-
tion are more comprehensible in light of this hypothesized "balanc-
ing doctrine." The property rights in Burton were less compelling
because the private property involved was open to the public; there
was no associational right asserted in Burton. In Moose Lodge, how-
ever, the right of free association was central; the private property
was ostensibly not open to the general public, and the injury to the
plaintiff's equal protection rights was relatively slight. Similarly,
Jackson fell on the Moose Lodge side of the line in part because
racial discrimination was not a factor on the plaintiff's side of the
scales.67 Viewed this way, the determination of the state action issue
in Jackson was in fact an implicit weighing and balancing of the
nature of the right asserted,"5 the potential harm of denying the
right,6" the potential costs to Metropolitan and its subscribers of
cations Commission ruling in support of CBS constituted governmental action; six separate
positions were expressed on the issue.
67. One of the foremost concerns of the Court over the past three decades has been the
elimination of racial discrimination; most cases in which state action has been found have
involved this discrimination. Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (N.D. Ind.
1970) (the state action doctrine developed in response to efforts to eliminate forms of private
racial discrimination). Some courts and judges have openly acknowledged a policy of eradi-
cating state involvement, "however subtle and indirect," in ostensibly private discrimination;
this was typified by the statement of Justice Brennan that the "state action doctrine reflects
the profound judgment that denials of equal treatment, and particularly denials on account
of race or color, are singularly grave when government has or shares responsibility." Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See
also Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1970) and materials cited
therein.
Therefore a claim of constitutional infringement based on race is most likely a great influ-
ence on the Court's implicit or explicit balancing of conflicting rights.
68. The right asserted is the due process right of a hearing prior to the severance of a
property right. Whether electric service to the home is a property right was an issue not
reached by the Jackson Court, although the parties had briefed it thoroughly. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (employment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(household goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare payments); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(wages).
69. Terminations may produce even fatal results. See note 60 supra. The cases considering
the issue have found utility company error rates to be as high as 16%, Bronson v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1972), although there is some question as
to the meaning of such figures. The literature speaks of such social costs as frustration and
alienation; see Terminations, supra note 37, at 1482.
The cases have described the utilities' capacity for incompetence and callousness as "Or-
wellian," Bronson, supra, at 444, and have cataloged numerous individual instances of stu-
pidity and rude indifference. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 158 (6th Cir. 1973).
The consumer's plight was eloquently recognized over eighty years ago in Wood v. City of
Auburn, 87 Me. 287, 32 A. 906, 908 (1895).
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affirming the right sought,70 and the value to society of the right to
enjoy property undisturbed.
If the Court actually is applying this implicit approach, there is
a problem in that the balancing is implicit; the observer does not
know which factors were weighed and which ignored, or their rela-
tive importance. For example, before Moose Lodge reached the Su-
preme Court, at least one commentator predicted with satisfaction
that the Court would at last be faced with an overall examination
of the right of free association." However, the Court avoided the
issue of free association entirely;72 because it found no state action,
it was unnecessary to decide among the conflicting constitutional
assertions.73 A further problem is that although the process of deci-
sion may be a delicate case-by-case balancing, the printed decision
is stated in straightforward, unequivocal, and therefore potentially
overbroad terms. In Jackson, this gave rise to the fear expressed by
Justice Marshall that such language, if construed literally by some
future court, would inevitably lead to the result that a public utility
could refuse service to minorities or any other group with impunity
from constitutional attack. 4 That result was incredible to Justice
Marshall, and probably to at least a majority of the Court, but the
language of Jackson would appear to permit it.
CONCLUSION
It has been widely stated that Moose Lodge halted a continuous
70. The power of unrestricted termination is an often-used, potent collection tool. See
note 42 supra. If due process protections were applicable in termination cases, the mandated
hearing would need not be a full trial; the Court has held that due process is flexible in its
demands, and that the form of hearing may be adapted to fit the circumstances. Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972). See Terminations, supra note 37, at 1494-1504.
71. Comment, Private Clubs: Freedom of Association Overlooked in Effort to Guarantee
Equal Protection, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 905, 917 (1972).
72. 8 N. ENG. L. REv. 251, 267 (1973).
73. Another way of stating this result is that because the Court had already decided
between the conflicting assertions, it found no state action.
74. Justice Marshall stated:
Today the Court . . . adopts a stance that is bound to lead to mischief when applied
to problems beyond the narrow sphere of due process objections to utility termina-
tions. . . . The Court has not adopted the notion . . . that different standards should
apply to state action analysis when different constitutional claims are presented ...
Thus, the majority's analysis would seemingly apply as well to a company that refused
to extend service to Negroes. . . or any other group that the company preferred...
not to serve.
419 U.S. at 366, 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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expansion of the state action doctrine," even though the case could
be held closely to its particular facts. Jackson clearly forces a signifi-
cant retreat in the doctrine, because it represents probably the most
extreme set of circumstances in which the state may be involved
with a private actor possessing a most public nature.
The post-Jackson cases have shown a tendency to follow it closely,
though few exceptionally compelling claims have yet been pre-
sented."5 The language most cited from Jackson is the "nexus"
test," which seems to have become the standard in state action
cases; the test has so far been strictly applied." Several cases have
indicated in dicta that Justice Marshall's fears are unfounded; they
suggest that racial discrimination will remain a special category
with its own apparently lower standards for determining state ac-
tion."9 On the other hand, federal courts thus far have not found
Jackson an absolute bar to the finding of state action. Jackson ad-
mits that state action may exist in a private party's performance of
a function traditionally associated with sovereignty,"' and subse-
quently courts have found state action in the private sale by a lienor
of the debtor's goods8 and the possibility of state action in the
determination of entry to a licensed profession." Despite the appar-
ent evisceration of Burton, two courts have recognized its continu-
ing vitality by finding "joint ventures" between government and a
75. See, e.g., 26 RuT. L. REV. 888 (1973).
76. But see Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975). No state
action was found in the decisions of the defendant, a private non-profit corporation which
leased its facilities and all its equipment from Orange County for one dollar per year. In
addition, 8-'/2% of all county revenues went to retiring the bond issue and time warrants sold
to finance construction of the hospital. Although Jackson was cited in reaching this question-
able result, its true significance to the circuit court is unclear.
77. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
78. See, e.g., Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of Com-
merce, 508 F.2d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir. 1975); Steams v. VFW, 394 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C.
1975) (sex discrimination); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (hospital staff privileges); Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp.
1046, 1051 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (entry to a profession); Mattheis v. Jockey Club, 387 F. Supp.
1126, 1127 (E.D. Ky. 1975) (horse-breeders' association).
79. Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 878 n.9 (5th Cir. 1975); Spark
v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Both cases suggest that
a different and greater involvement is necessary to find state action when racial discrimina-
tion is not a factor.
80. 419 U.S. at 352.
81. Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
82. Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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private entity.8-' Nevertheless, in its revisionist reading of Pollak, its
weakening of Burton, and especially its extension of Moose Lodge,
Jackson vigorously suggests the Court will in the future be ex-
tremely reluctant to apply constitutional strictures to private par-
ties.
Stephen Jurman
83. Holodnack v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of Pgh.,
392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
